Strategy of Organisational Development for Ukrainian «second league» Political Parties

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Key terms: political parties, strategic planning, SWOT analysis, organizational development, dynamic networks.

Abstract:

In this publication, we provided details concerning our strategy for restructuring Ukrainian second level political parties in the process of designing their strategy of organizational development within the standard methodology of strategic planning. We presented our own vision of the organisational development of Ukrainian political parties, provided a general outline of the results of our analysis of the external and internal environments, discussed the results of SWOT analysis of the organizational development of Ukrainian political parties, identified strategic priorities, strategic goals and immediate objectives, and outlined our vision for their implementation by executive, project and controlling process groups within party management bodies.

The success of implementation of the proposed organisational development strategies by Ukrainian second level political parties is most dependent on the political will of their leaders, the level of awareness of the challenges in real time, their ability to distribute power among and executive functions, coordinate and synchronise their activities. Even partial implementation of the proposed strategies in some units of one of Ukrainian parties will give tangible results and can be the factor that will get the frozen hierarchical structure off the ground, triggering transformation of this party (a
clone of the Soviet Communist Party) into a modern political force able to implement participatory governance and self-reconstruction.

This version: February 06, 2015

First published in Ukrainian: December 07, 2016

Ukrainian political parties and the party system as a whole are in deep crisis. Moreover, every year the situation is getting worse, the life cycle of political organisations is declining, while their qualities, in fact, remain the same [1].

Attempts to transfer to the Ukrainian soil recipes for successful reform of parties and party systems in other countries did not yield positive results. Quite the contrary. For example, the recently adopted, definitely reformist law on public funding of political parties, despite all its positive aspects, stands a better chance to lead to results that are contrary to expectations. It will further strengthen the premier league parties that are already sufficiently financed by stakeholders (oligarchic clans), which will automatically help them monopolise the political activity in Ukraine and stripe all other political projects of chances to succeed. This, in turn, will perpetuate and conserve the worst features of these parties – i.e. the concentration of power in the narrow circle of politicians, the lack of strong and influential grassroots organisations (often much of the grassroots organisations as such), general passivity of rank-and-file party members, direct or indirect external control on the part of a powerful organisations – oligarchic clans, intelligence agencies, organised crime groups.

Negative trends in the functioning of political parties and party systems are also manifest in the most developed Western countries (although to a lesser extent), where politicians prone to populism in their rhetoric are becoming increasingly more popular – they deliberately offer simple solutions to complex social problems and openly promote authoritarianism. Increasingly more often, the top government positions in democratic countries go to rather dubious politicians or blatant lobbyists of the interests of other (usually hostile) authoritarian states, which will inevitably lead to the emergence of immensely complex challenges in these countries in the medium term.
The described trends make us pay special attention to the Ukrainian «second league» parties that have a sufficient number of members and units across Ukraine, gained successful experience in local and to some extent in parliamentary elections, have ambitious leaders who so far have not come under external control on the part of internal more powerful organisations or geopolitical entities.

It is obvious that they will suffer first from monopolisation of political activity by leading parties. Unlike the large number of “couch parties”, they have something to lose – their chances of electoral success at the national level every year will be becoming smaller, and their most active members due to lack of prospects will swiftly move to the monopolist political organisations with complex state and oligarchic funding.

In our view, for the next few years, such parties will still have a window of opportunity open for their reorganisation and, accordingly, for the acquisition of new skills for a leap in activity to make it to the top league of Ukrainian politics and implement their program goals using the received share of power. This period is short, which means Ukrainian political parties of the «second league» urgently need to design, adopt and implement successful strategies for organisational development.

In publication [2], we demonstrated that the success of any strategy for organisational development is primarily dependent on the successful choice of the restructuring concept. It will determine the nature of the changes that will be implemented in political parties, and trigger the emergence of new properties that will provide them with competitive advantages. In the same publication, we presented our concept of restructuring of political parties in Ukraine and the corresponding strategy for restructuring that involves first of all institutionalisation of the managing bodies of all party units, and further institutionalisation of the units as a whole by
introducing a variable structure – dynamic network and an aggregate of all corresponding intra-organisational processes and systems for monitoring their progress in accordance with the set order for the deployment of the variable structures, which will ensure the functioning of political parties within the chosen activity concept and relevant principles of financing.

The aim of this publication is to specify the proposed strategy for restructuring Ukrainian political parties of the «second league» in the process of designing a strategy of their organisational development within the framework of standard strategic planning methods.

**Vision of Organisational Development**

In our publications [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], we developed and substantiated the overall Vision of the organisational development of a successful party after its effective implementation of the proposed restructuring strategy to wide-ranging deployment of its potential:

*A successful political party is a collective organisational entity (Subject) created and developed by the best methods, composed of geographically distributed and capable of numerical growth large groups of people, which constitute an active, multi-intelligent social model organism endowed with senses, consciousness and will, able to reproduce itself over a long time, and capable of cognising and changing the world: to adequately perceive information from internal and external environments; to process and analyse it in a rational plane; to understand its own interests; to cyclically implement regulatory planning for their realisation, consisting in an open choice of means, objectives, goals and ideals; and to deliberately act in accordance with the developed and adopted plans.*
Analysis of Internal and External Organisational Environment

In a number of our publications, we analysed the external environment of Ukrainian political parties in terms of the organisational approach.

In particular, our publications [9, 10] discussed the structure and subjects of informal government that can exert influence on Ukrainian society and the legislatively established public authorities. We reasonably concluded that the real power in Ukraine is split between management entities – formal and informal organisational systems, each of which occupies a fixed position in their hierarchy, so that the scope of discretion at each of the lower levels is limited by the strategy of a subject of a higher level of management.

In our publications [11], we demonstrated that the ruling elite of the classic oligarchy as a political regime has a variable structure where decisions are made and taken by a closed informal group of people who interact from the “equal-to-equal” position that corresponds to the structure of a horizontal network; further these decisions are implemented by formal, constitutionally and legislatively established hierarchical organisations that are directly subordinate to and controlled by the members of this group.

Our publications [12], demonstrated that changes to the Constitution, changes of the ruling elite, changes of the balance of powers, decentralisation or centralisation significantly affect only the powers of formal power subjects, while the features and possibilities of informal power subjects remain practically the same, since they have a high adaptive capacity due to the heterarchical structure. Thus, the informal power structure serves as the invariant during transition from one system to another as a result of reform, transferring the patterns and properties inherent in the old system to the new
Thus, we can argue that to change the system effectively we should protect political parties from the influence of informal power subjects so that the centre of decision-making could be transferred to formal power subjects, which can be implemented only through redistribution of the absolute intra-organisation power concentrated in the hands of party leaders among all party members.

In a number of other publications [1, 8, 13, 14, 15], we carried out an interdisciplinary analysis of the internal organisational environment of Ukrainian political parties. Based on its results, we developed and presented a concept of their restructuring, which is in general terms described in publications [2, 16]. It implies application of the method we developed and theoretically validated to purposefully modify the natural group dynamics in units of political organisations using relevant organisational tools and social technologies to prevent interpersonal and intergroup conflicts in the intra-organisational environment.

**SWOT-Analysis of Organisational Development**

Undoubtedly, SWOT-analysis of the organisational development of each individual party should be conducted collectively – i.e. by a group of experts of different profiles involving the most active party members who have first-hand knowledge of the practices and characteristics of the practical activity of the party.

The further results of our SWOT-analysis of the institutional development of political parties in the context of the above proposed vision is undeniably too generalised and incomplete, but we believe that even so they can be successfully used as a basis for developing strategies for the restructuring of Ukrainian political «second league» parties.
1. **Strengths** – features and resources that can be used for organisational development. **Actions to draw on the available strengths.**

1.1. The presence of some successful party organisations at regional and local levels across the country.

**Action:** *Strengthening the institutional capacity of regional party organisations by institutionalising primarily their managing bodies, and then their general meetings.*

1.2. Financial independence from oligarchic clans and external donors.

**Action:** *Gradual introduction of a transparent funding system to avoid external influence on the activities of the political organisation.*

1.3. Discrete cases of electoral success at the regional and local levels in the last election and presence of a number of deputies at the local and regional levels.

**Action:** *Organisation of activity of local and regional political organisations headed by deputies in order to work out strategies for development of municipalities and regions where they were elected.*

1.4. A team of like-minded people at the highest governing body and their commitment to implementing organisational change.

**Action:** *Expanding this team into the large group and institutionalisation of the managing body of the party.*

2. **Weaknesses** include internal flaws and limitations that threaten organisational development. **Actions to address the weaknesses.**

2.1. Lack of information in the media about the party and its position on important issues.

**Action:** *Converting the party into a “live” mass medium and broadcasting its own intellectual products, promoting a relevant discourse and senses.*

2.2. Low recognisability of the leader.
**Action:** Relying on a team of equal politicians who cooperate to reinforce each other.

2.3. Tendency to simulate activities (fake party).

**Action:** Choice and introduction of modern techniques and methodologies of work that ensure the fulfilment of real work and its relevance. Organisation, systematisation and operationalisation of activity.

2.4. Lack of party position on critical issues of public life.

**Action:** Developing and launching a set of party life processes that provide real-time production of party positions on pressing issues of public life, involving party units at all levels.

2.5. A narrow niche of party activity and restriction of its intensity during periods of increased production involvement of party members (seasonal activity).

**Action:** Targeted activity niche expansion to cover the entire range of social and political issues through creation of specialised groups in the managing bodies of party units at all levels, involving politicians and experts of relevant profiles. The involvement of versatile politicians and experts and expansion of the membership base will solve the problem of the seasonal activity of party members.

2.6. Low motivation of party members to engage in intense activity within it. Passivity of members and units of the party.

**Action:** Introduction of participatory (joint) management in the party units at all levels.

Activation of biologically determined activity motivators of party members by preventing the process of their ranking within party units by precluding interpersonal and intergroup conflicts through conflict-free tools for arranging the activity of large groups of people and the corresponding social technologies.
Enabling the security motivator – i.e. generation and strengthening of a sense of security of party members against external threats.

Enabling the status motivator – i.e. continuous formation and systemic training of the candidate pool in order to be ready to quickly appoint people to all appropriate positions in elected and executive bodies at all levels after the party wins the election.

Enabling the motivator of belonging – i.e. creation of a friendly and supportive environment in party units.

Enabling the motivator of self-fulfilment by creating conditions for creativity and systematic monitoring and evaluation of the contribution of each party member to the common cause, and its recognition by the party.

2.7. Low integration of regional and local party units with civil society and, consequently, low motivation of civil activists and politicians to join the party.

**Action:** Deliberate and systematic involvement of civil society activists and politicians in the activity of party units at all levels to produce intellectual products – development strategies of localities, regions and the country.

2.8. Failure to systemically produce intellectual products of the required quality at all organisational levels of the party because of the lack of an effective unified methodology of their activity.

**Action:** Choice and implementation in the party activity of a methodology of strategic planning, development and launch of corresponding cyclic processes based on organisational tools of conflict-free interaction of large groups of people and the corresponding social technologies.

2.9. Conscious or unconscious exclusion and supplanting by leaders of party units of the most active members as potential competitors who have the potential to lay claim to leadership in these units.
**Action:** Opting for and implementation in party units at all levels of the organisational tools of conflict-free interaction of large groups and corresponding social technologies that could ensure a more or less even distribution of power among organisation members and thwart any attempts to gain and concentrate the power in their hands.

2.10. Blocking by party unit leaders of any attempts to attract talented and promising politicians and experts as party members and promote them to governing positions in these units due to conscious or unconscious perception of these politicians/experts as a threat to their leadership status.

**Action:** See the action to p. 2. 9.

2.11. Party units at all levels lack sufficiently trained candidate pool ready and able to occupy leadership positions in government.

**Action:** Opting for and use of organisational tools and corresponding social technologies that would allow in the short term to prepare a talent pool and motivate its members to engage in lifelong learning and self-development.

2.12. Reduction of the number of nominal and active members of the party due to their passivation as a result of their inability to influence the processes of decision-making and decision-taking.

**Action:** Selection and use of organisational tools and corresponding social technologies in units of political organisation at all levels that would ensure an opportunity for all active members to influence the processes of decision-taking and decision-making and would allow each of them to fulfil their potential and gain recognition of their contribution to the collective activity on the part of the general meeting of the party unit.
3. Opportunities – advantageous moments generated by the internal and external environment that could contribute to the organisational development. Actions to fulfil such opportunities.

3.1. The sharp increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of the political party as a result of its acquisition of integrity and subjectivity in the first place due to the development of such qualities by the managing body of all its units.

**Action:** Institutionalisation of the party managing bodies as a result of opting for and use of modern organisational tools and corresponding social technologies in order to acquire collective subjectivity as the ability to act in the rational plane including large groups capable of numerical growth, getting rid of any external influence on their activities.

3.2. Involvement of high status politicians in the political party. The growth of the total number of members in the political organisation and, therefore, its potential.

**Action:** Opting for in the party units at all levels and use of the organisational tools of conflict-free interaction of large groups and corresponding social technologies that will help: 1) avoid interpersonal and intergroup conflicts between members in the process of ranking; 2) prevent raiding and dissent; 3) create conditions for unreserved effective cooperation of party members in the process of collective activity.

3.3. Involvement in the managing bodies of party units at all levels of all those who wish, can and have the potential to successfully work in them.

**Action:** Setting the minimum number of the managing bodies of party units at all levels that would ensure their operation including large groups capable of numerical growth without losing their properties as a result of streamlining collective work due to relevant organisational tools and social technologies.
3.4. Creating a complex “live” development strategy for Ukraine based on the strategies of development of all regions, districts and localities that are systemically developed, updated and improved by party units of corresponding levels.

**Action:** Choosing and implementing in party activities a methodology of strategic planning. Establishment and recognition of complex development strategies for territories and populated places as a product of activity of party units at all levels.

4. Threats include internal and external factors which could adversely affect organisational development. Actions to minimise risks and threats.

4.1. Manifestations of Michels’ “iron” law of oligarchy, implying a gradual and inevitable concentration of power first in the managing nucleus, and later in the hands of one leader with simultaneous passivation of rank-and-file party members [17]. Michels identified the following stages and signs of oligarchy: emergence of leadership; emergence of professional management and its organisation; formation of bureaucracy, i.e. paid appointed administration; centralisation of power; reorientation of the objectives from final to current ones; reinforcement of the ideological regime; increasing difference between the interests and ideological positions of leaders and those of party members, while the interests and ideological positions of leaders are dominant; reduction of the role of party members in decision-making; co-optation of opposition party leaders to the ranks of existing management; orientation of the party to support of all voters, rather than just their class. In our publications [13], we described the social and psychological mechanisms that trigger Michels’ law of oligarchy at the micro and macro levels.

**Action:** Institutionalising the management bodies of all party units, and later, when the units are ready, introducing there a variable structure – dynamic network and the aggregate of all corresponding intra-organisational processes and systems for
monitoring their progress in accordance with the set order for the deployment of the variable structures, which will ensure the functioning of political parties within the chosen activity concept and relevant principles of financing.

4.2. The leader is caught in the “Founder’s Trap” (to use the term from I. Adizes’ methodology) because the organisation outgrows the leader’s ability to effectively manage it alone. The “Founder’s Trap” occurs when the organisation outgrows the leader’s ability to implement his/her personal management style and philosophy and can no longer exist as a one-man show [18].

In publication [7], we considered in detail the problem of falling into the founder’s trap as exemplified by leaders of Ukrainian political organisations. Those of them who managed to move to the “go-go” stage and get some electoral support, rapidly develop both due to the enthusiasm of their founders and new adherents and due to the emergence of new moneyed investors (first of all oligarchs) who tend to put their eggs in different baskets. At this point, a political organisation created by order of or directly by oligarchic clans is rapidly gaining electoral support due to its oppositional and often populist rhetoric and intensive use of media technologies. A political party created without the initial financial resources of oligarchic origin that by chance and due to its systemic work acquired certain electoral weight turns into a highly liquid commodity that has a high price and is in high enough demand among oligarchic clans that offer money in exchange for the right to form part of the electoral list for councils of different levels. This feature becomes an insurmountable obstacle for young and promising political organisations when attempting to go to the adolescence stage because they are artificially driven into the founder’s trap by external actors – i.e. oligarchic clans, intelligence agencies or criminals. This so happens because a hierarchically structured political organisation where power is consolidated in the hands of a single leader is
exposed to external control, accurately and unequivocally executing the paymaster’s orders. Another aspect contributing to this situation is a typical human weakness – i.e. the Founder’s disproportionate leadership ambitions that develop as a result of deliberate abuse of absolute power within the organisation and are artificially nurtured by subjects of external control.

**Action:** *See action for p. 4. 1.*

4.3. Manifestation of “paradoxes of the leader” [19], entailing relationship problems within the managing body consisting of a small group and, as a consequence, a change of the team by the leader by ousting from the organisation of the fellows who led the party and him personally to electoral success:

Usually, most famous persons in the history had three “teams”: 1) the “team” driving the leader to power, 2) the “dream team” of the peak of his governance, and 3) the “undertaker team” of the final period of the leader’s governance. These three “teams” perform different functions, are formed based on different principles and different grounds, and play different roles for the leader. In the first “team”, the leader often serves as a “junior partner” – this “team” may be a legacy of the former leader. The second “team” is a “union of like-minded people”, “fellows”, and “friends” who ensure the position of “the first among equals” for the leader. Finally, the third “team” or a “pack” emerges when the leader achieves monopoly on power and is potentially dangerous for him.

A special phenomenon in the “leader–group” relationship is the so-called “paradox of the leader”. Its essence is simple: there are no eternal leaders. When becoming the leader of a group, gaining leadership skills and authority, any leader thus begins to prepare the fall of his leadership. This paradox usually manifests in two ways. Paradox No. 1: expanding the scope of his leadership, becoming the leader of a
larger community, the leader is bound to act contrary to the interests of a small group that brought him to power. Thus, this small group begins to deny him the leader status and starts looking for a suitable successor. Paradox No. 2: the more active and business-minded the leader is, the more he complicates interpersonal relationships in the group, the more it exacerbates the morale, leading to increased dissatisfaction with the leader. Accordingly, the less business-minded, the more informal and friendly the leader is, the lower the requirements to fellows and the lower the effectiveness of achievements in the group. This reduces the achievements of the group (although improving the morale) and leads to increased discontent. In both versions, sooner or later, the group begins to refuse to trust the leader. These mechanisms ensure self-regulation of the “leader–team” relationship.

**Action:** See action for p. 4. 1.

4.4. Negative selection inherent in hierarchical political organisations, where incompetent villains have an advantage over competent and decent members of the organisation due to the greater variability in their behavioural patterns and strategies they can use successfully in competition with opponents for positions and status.

**Action:** See action for p. 4. 1.

4.5. Dependence of those who delegated power to leaders at party meetings, conferences and congresses on those to whom the power was delegated. [20]

**Action:** Purposeful replacement of the election principle involving power delegation, whereby members of meetings, conferences or congresses elect managing, executive and supervisory bodies and delegate to them their power, with the principle of their appointment by the same meeting, endowing the appointed persons with relevant limited powers for a limited time. Obviously, such a replacement is possible only after institutionalisation of the party managing bodies at all levels and acquisition of
collective subjectivity by them as the ability to act in a rational plane involving large groups able to overcome external influence on their activity.

4.6. The threat of merging for the party with other political forces as a result of a decision taken at the sole discretion of the leader, who has concentrated enough power in the organisation as a result of Michels’ law of oligarchy. The threat of such transfer of entire regional and local units to other political organisations as a result of individual decisions of their leaders who concentrated enough power in their units.

**Action:** Distribution of power in the political organisation among the members of the institutionalised governing bodies of its units at all levels including large groups in the process of their orderly systemic activity.

4.7. Establishment of external management over the party after it acquired certain electoral significance as a result of aggressive interference of more powerful external actors.

**Action:** See the action for p. 4. 6.

4.8. The threat of illegal takeover and party dissent due to internal conflicts among its leaders as a result of escalation of the intra-party competition to confrontation.

**Action:** Systemic blocking of potential interpersonal and intergroup conflicts in organisation units through the use of appropriate organisational tools and social technologies.

**Defining Strategic Priorities**

Strategic priorities (long-term horizon of 5-10 years) should constitute the most important goals of the political party, they have to be transparent, consistent, clearly
defined and comprehensible. Their implementation in this case should lead to the achievement of the above Vision of its organisational development.

Therefore, in our opinion, the most urgent task is to organise the internal interaction among members and units of the political party to avoid the above listed threats (1–4), which systematically led to degradation and failure of almost all registered Ukrainian political parties. This suggests the first strategic priority:

1. **Institutionalisation of the management bodies of all party units, and later, when ready, of the units themselves as a whole for them to acquire subjectivity consisting of a large group (25 persons or more) in the process of their activity by introducing a variable structure – dynamic network and the aggregate of all corresponding intra-organisational processes and systems for monitoring their progress.**

Implementation of the first priority automatically removes threat 5 by replacing the principle of delegation with the principle of appointment, as well as threats 6–8 due to the relatively even distribution of power among members of the managing bodies of party units at all levels and prevention of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts within them.

At the same time, the implementation of this priority makes it possible to realise opportunities 1–3, eliminate weaknesses 6, 7, 9–12, and make the most of strengths 1, 2, and 4.

Another, equally important priority is the following:

2. **Full-fledged integration of strategic planning methodologies in the party activity in order to effectively produce the main product of party units at all levels – i.e. strategies for development of populated places, territories and the country as a whole. Operationalisation of the party activity in accordance with this methodology**
through the use of organisational tools for conflict-free work of large groups of people as the basis of the variable structure – dynamic network. Development and formalisation of the corresponding cyclic processes and integrating them in the activity of party units at all levels.

This strategic priority eliminates one of the key weaknesses of the party (8) – i.e. its inability to systematically produce intellectual products of the required quality in units of all organisational levels, as well as makes it possible to automatically eliminate weak points 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7, make the most of strengths 3, and realise opportunity 4.

**Defining Goals and Objectives of Organisational Development**

Strategic goals (middle-term horizon of 2–5 years) are designed to specify the medium term priorities and must meet certain requirements, namely: to be specific, measurable, mutually agreed, realistic, and time-limited. They are usually determined based on the analysis of causes and effects [21]. This method helps identify the key obstacles that hinder implementation of the chosen priority. For each obstacle, the effects (manifestations) of its existence, and the main causes for its emergence are identified. Actions should be aimed at eliminating the causes, rather than fighting the effects. Therefore, the main causes turn into strategic goals.

Immediate objectives are the most specific aims, helping to link strategic activity with current undertakings and budget planning. Within the cause-and-effect analysis, based on the results of organisational party development analysis, the root causes that triggered the key causes are identified. The root causes turn into immediate objectives. Usually, such analysis for each of the main obstacles yields up to three key causes, and up to three or four root causes for each of the main causes. Otherwise, the
analysis will be excessively complicated and the strategy-makers’ attention would focus on insignificant factors.

A step-by-step description of the application of the cause-and-effect analysis to determine strategic goals and immediate objectives is not included in the main body of this publication due to its large scope. For details, please, see Annex [23] to this publication.

Here we present only a summary table of the goals-and-objectives tree generated based on such analysis.

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<tr>
<th>Strategic priority 1</th>
<th>Strategic goals</th>
<th>Immediate objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. Theoretical and practical mastering by all members of the organisation and candidates to membership of the basic laws of organisation theory, social psychology, ethology, organisational behaviour, political science, theory of elites and other related disciplines that together constitute an interdisciplinary theory of political organisations.</td>
<td>1.1.1. Introduction of a series of lectures and workshops on the theory of political organisations in regional party organisations as part of the general concept of party management training and preparation.</td>
<td>1.1.2. Organisation of lectures and practical classes in civil society environments in regions and districts, involving local experts on topics selected by the relevant decision of the central governing body of the political party.</td>
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| 1.2. Development and dissemination of a new organisational culture in the party environment and other favourable environments of civil society by deliberately conducting a plurality of different activities, including goals and topics specified in the program documents of the party. | 1.2.1. Systemically holding the general meetings of party units and their governing bodies in the dynamic network; initially to discuss relevant topics, and further to produce strategies for development of populated places, regions and the country involving civil society, journalists, academics, government officials, and politicians from other parties.  
1.2.2. Focusing the attention of the members of the general meeting on the dynamic network algorithm and to its socio-psychological specifics, formation and integration of group teamwork norms under this algorithm, actualisation and members’ awareness of the new organisational culture and its differences from the organisational culture of hierarchically structured political parties.  
1.2.3. Gradual transition to the fulfilment by established executive and project teams of the operational plans developed during the strategic planning, and ensuring control over the results of their activities. |
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<td>1.3. Determined integration of organisational changes by leaders of the political organisation in the</td>
<td>1.3.1. Distribution of the members of the central governing body into specialised groups by the directions of the party activity and organisation of their collective interaction based on the algorithm work of</td>
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centre and gradually spreading them to regional and local levels as the party units are ready.

the dynamic network that blocks interpersonal and intergroup conflicts and channels the energy generated for them to fulfil the programme tasks facing the political organisation.

1.3.2. Involvement of leaders of regional party units in the collective work in its central governing body in the dynamic network.

1.3.3. Preparation and launch of pilot projects to implement organisational changes in a number of regional units of political parties, test them, correct, and improve to spread to the entire political organisation.

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic goals</strong></td>
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| 2.1. Acquisition by party leaders, party members, and civil society activists of the strategic planning methodology in the process of systemic holding of joint party and civil society activities in the centre and in regions to discuss relevant issues of national importance. | 2.1.1. Introduction of a series of lectures and workshops on the methodology of strategic planning in regional party units as part of the general concept of party management training and preparation.  
  
2.1.2. Systemic holding of joint party and civil society activities in the centre and in regions to discuss topical issues of Ukrainian society, using strategic planning methods and tools, and further – to develop joint strategies for development of populated places, regions, and the country.  
  
2.1.3. Shift of the focus of leaders and members |
2.2. Development, preparation and setup for all party units of unified and standardized processes for strategic planning, which when implemented would make up a coherent development strategy for Ukraine and make it possible to track, get to know, assess and monitor products of each unit.

2.2.1. Pilot projects aimed at developing for the central and regional governing bodies of unified and standardized processes of strategic planning undertaken in large groups during their interaction in the dynamic network.

2.2.2. Creation of a unified database to accumulate results of the activity of all units of the political organisation at all levels, enabling the establishment of their horizontal and vertical links, analysis, comparison, and accumulation of knowledge.

2.2.3. Creating a system of control over the units of the political organisation at all levels to produce strategies for development of populated places, regions and the country, as well as over adherence to the algorithm of work of the general meeting and execution of the produced action plans.
2.3. Integration in the party activities of the central regional units of an aggregate of cyclical processes of strategic planning. Production of strategies for development of localities, districts, regions, and the country by relevant units and collective bodies of the political organisation.

2.3.1. Integration in the activity of the central governing body through its wilful decision of processes for producing a strategy of development of Ukraine and pilot projects for wilful introduction into the activity of the managing bodies of regional organisations of processes to produce strategies for development of relevant regions.

2.3.2. Integration of the strategizing results of the central managing body and regional units within pilot projects and their accumulation in a unified database after choosing its conception and producing programmes.

2.3.3. Launch, adaptation and configuration based on process management of a system to monitor the activity of the central and regional governing bodies within pilot projects in the regions.

Creation of Executive Project and Control Process Groups

To implement the produced strategic goals and immediate objectives in the central management body, the party should create an organisational specialised group, which, in turn, would initiate the establishment and coordinate the activity of three project groups and a number of process control groups. In our opinion, the project
groups would implement all produced immediate objectives, in particular, the first group would carry out the institutionalisation of the managing bodies of the units of the political organisation by introducing a variable structure – dynamic network; the second group would integrate strategic planning methodology into party activities; the third group would organise, methodically and methodologically maintain training for party activists. They would have to include members of the organisational specialised group of the governing body, specialists in work in a dynamic network, social technologists, strategic planning experts, specialists in programming, experts in social psychology, sociology, ethology, management, organisational behaviour, and so on.

Each project team would have to develop action plans for the implementation of its assigned objectives (see. Annex [23] to this publication), submit them for approval to the governing body, and implement and coordinate their activities at the level of the organisational specialised group.

Supervising process control groups would carry out continuous monitoring and periodically generate reports on compliance of the basic cyclic process of internal restructuring with algorithms approved by the governing body of the variable structure – dynamic network; on implementation of adopted decisions and processes to implement strategic and operational plans; on the flow of information within the organisation; on the compliance of the characteristics of internal processes of the organisation with the set parameters, etc.

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The success of «second league» Ukrainian political parties in implementing the proposed organisational development strategies depends primarily on the political will of their leaders, the level of their awareness of the challenges emerging in real time, their ability to distribute power and executive functions among themselves, coordinate
and synchronise their activities. Even partial implementation of the proposed strategies in some units of one of Ukrainian parties will give tangible results and can be the factor that will get the frozen hierarchical structure off the ground, triggering transformation of this party (a clone of the Soviet Communist Party) into a modern political force able to implement participatory governance and self-reconstruction [22].

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